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RF: How did you get interested in the economics 
of sports?
Sauer: I became interested when I read a paper assigned in my
first graduate microeconomic theory course. It was titled 
“Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball” by Gerald
Scully, and it appeared in the American Economic Reviewin 1974.
I think that’s one of the best papers written in economics in the
past 50 years. It took economic theory, applied it to a 
relevant and current topic, and made a prediction. And, lo and
behold, free agency came to Major League Baseball shortly
afterward and proved Scully’s theory and application to be dead
on the mark. 
Essentially, Scully studied data on players’ productivity and
wages from the late 1960s, a period when players were subject
to the reserve clause. That meant they had virtually no bargain-
ing power. They either re-signed with the team they were with
or they went back to the farm, which some of them did. But
when Marvin Miller, head of the players’ union, argued that the
contract actually permitted free agency and an arbitrator
agreed with him, the whole game changed. Players began to be
paid according to market rates, and salaries increased by multi-
ples that were consistent with what Scully’s model predicted.
When people ask career counselors for advice, a
common response is: Do something you love and
you’ll never be bored. It’s a bit trite, of course, but
it’s also generally true. Raymond Sauer is a good
example. He has been able to combine two of his
interests — economics and sports — to his profes-
sional advantage. In a series of papers, he has used
the tools of economics to answer questions from
the world of sport, and in the process produced
insights for economists working in industrial
organization, labor markets, and other fields.
Sauer is chairman of the Department of
Economics at Clemson University. In addition 
to his work on the economics of sports, he has
written about the economics of regulation, 
monetary economics, and the organization of 
academic labor markets. 
Since February 2004, he has maintained a blog
devoted to economic commentary on sports and
society, thesportseconomist.com, which features
occasional posts by other contributors. 
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So that paper was truly great and inspired me to look more
closely at the economics of sports. 
Then there was a paper that wasn’t so great. The topic was
the supposed inefficiency of betting markets in the National
Football League (NFL). I had gotten interested in the work in
rational expectations and financial market efficiency, and here
was this paper that said it was easy to make money betting on
football games, that there were opportunities just waiting to be
exploited. I thought this was not consistent with theory, 
gathered data to assess its merits, and concluded it wasn’t right.
So that was the first time I applied economics to sports in a pro-
fessional way, and it led to one of my earliest published papers.  
RF: The field seems to be gaining popularity within the
profession. Why do you think there is more research being
done in this area now? 
Sauer: I think it comes down to two things. One, economics is
data-driven, and there are a lot of good data available in sports.
Second, sports are popular and are a market like any other so
they present useful opportunities to take economic theory and
apply it to issues that interest a lot of people. 
RF: Each of the four major North American sports
leagues,  with the exception of Major League Baseball, has
faced a rival league over the past 40 years. In some cases,
the rival league has introduced changes that the dominant
league eventually adopted. And some of the rival leagues’
franchises eventually became members of the dominant
leagues following mergers. But none of those leagues was
able to supplant the incumbent. Why? Can you imagine
conditions under which one of  the incumbents could be
driven out of the market by a new entrant?
Sauer: I think it would take a colossal mistake for one of the
major leagues to be supplanted by an upstart. There’s a tremen-
dous amount of social capital that is embedded in loyalty to
teams, rivalries, and so on. That goes beyond appreciation of
the game itself.
This is true in the North American leagues, but the best
example is European soccer. If you watch the Italian Soccer
League, for instance, you will see that the fans are packed
behind the goal, which is one of the worst places to actually
view the game. You get a much better view from being at mid-
field. But they are behind the goal for purely social reasons. So
it’s something other than the game itself that is capturing the
attention and imagination of the fans. That’s an extreme 
example of what I am talking about, but we see it in almost all
sports. It’s not easy to re-create that loyalty even if you 
introduce a new league with great talent and innovative rules. 
I think the existing leagues have figured this out, and they
design their competition to take advantage of it. Once upon a
time, sport was performance art, like figure skating or boxing.
It’s not an event any longer. It’s a drama that unfolds over the
course of a season, which is a pretty long time, and leagues have
structured themselves accordingly. 
In fact, I think this is the biggest thing that separates sports
which have been economically successful over the past 50 years
from those that haven’t. People no longer have great interest in
watching a single event. They want to watch a sequence of
events tied together over time that lead to a big finale like the
Super Bowl or World Series. 
Also, some of the sports that were very successful in the past
but are having problems now, like boxing, are organizationally
inept. Owners and officials in baseball, football, and basketball
realized that they needed to become organized and unified and
behave like a firm. That never happened in boxing. You have
several warring factions that have been unable or unwilling to
act together in the way that the team sports have. For instance,
you still have several sanctioning bodies: the World Boxing
Association, the World Boxing Organization, and the
International Boxing Organization among others. That presents
some real difficulties for the sport, from both a fan standpoint
and an economic standpoint. Then, of course, there is the issue
of corruption, which still exists and troubles the sport.
RF: How about rival leagues with less ambitious goals —
leagues that aren’t designed to become dominant but
rather serve a niche market? Is there sufficient demand to
keep those leagues afloat, given what you have said about
consumer loyalty to existing teams?
Sauer: The Arena Football League fits that description, I 
think. The league has been going for some time now, a lot of
people like the game, and the league is making money. It  has an
interesting business model, and markets itself as professional
football, without attempting to supplant the NFL. It’s 
satisfying a demand that is out there, and the players are highly
versatile and talented athletes who just can’t make it in the
NFL. In part, that’s because the skills required to play in the
NFLhave become so specialized. 
Could the Arena League become more interesting than the
NFL? Maybe. But it’s going to be very difficult to get, say,
Pittsburgh Steelers fans to switch their loyalties.
In general, I think we are looking from the top of the 
mountain now in professional sports. The growth that we have
seen in the past century has been absolutely phenomenal. If you
were living in 1950 and were trying to forecast what the most
popular sport would be in 2006, you might have said horse 
racing. The NFL, NBA, and NHL weren’t nearly as popular as
they are today. Baseball was it in terms of team sports. Some
other form of competition could, in the future, attract people’s
interest, but what that would be is very hard to say.
RF: What do you think accounts for this tremendous
growth in professional sports?
Sauer:Looking at purely economic factors, you have to say that
the growth in income and leisure time are most important. But
there’s no inherent reason why that increased income and
leisure time would go toward sports instead of, say, opera.
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a great deal of time investment to understand and appreciate
what is going on. There’s another thing that I think is impor-
tant. Most kids play sports from a very early age. And even if
they don’t progress with it and play on, say, their high school or 
college teams, they tend to maintain an interest 
in sports throughout their lives. 
RF: What do you think of revenue sharing as a way to
increase parity in professional sports leagues?
Sauer: Theoretically, it doesn’t work. Revenue sharing 
decreases the monetary incentive to acquire talent in equal 
proportion for both big market teams and small market teams.
And it works this way in practice also. 
Let’s consider an example of a league that has revenue 
sharing — the NFL. You have had franchises that for a decade
apparently just didn’t care about putting a competitive team on
the field. Their teams could stink, they could lose fan base, but
they could still collect a big check from the NFL and make
money. The Cincinnati Bengals were
a good example of that from the early
1990s until recently.
Generally, I think the NFL has a
big problem. Red McCombs, the for-
mer owner of the Minnesota Vikings,
was recently quoted as saying that the
NFL had the best business model of
any sport in the world. The owners
do make a lot of money. But they did-
n’t build the league by being socialist, and they are the most
socialist sport in the world. That doesn’t bode well for future
growth. 
I think it’s more compelling to watch a clash of the titans
than it is to see the best of a mediocre lot. NFLrules, which are
designed to share the wealth and get parity, don’t produce 
excellence. I think we saw that in the last Super Bowl. It was a
mediocre event this year. People follow dynasties; they don’t
follow the winner of a coin-flip competition. And NFL rules,
unless they are changed significantly, can produce something
akin to a coin-flip competition.
Don’t get me wrong. There are still great athletes in the NFL
— some of the best athletes in the world — but, as I said before,
we don’t necessarily watch sports to see great individual 
performances. We watch them for the team competition. Also, 
in a sport like football, unless a great player is on the same team
with other great athletes, his ability to showcase his talents is
severely limited. For instance, if a guard misses a key block, it
doesn’t matter what the quarterback or wide receiver can do.
One player’s productivity is related to his teammates’ produc-
tivity. So even the element of great individual performance is 
in jeopardy.
There are some people in the NFL who are aware of the
problems that the league faces, and they may be able to push
the league in a more competitive direction. But a lot of the
owners who are raking in money now will resist. And as it
stands, the NFLfaces some very serious problems. Parity is not
a goal worth pursuing at the expense of drama, excellence, and
great competition.
RF:  So you would say that parity is overrated?
Sauer: Yes. Look at Major League Baseball. The New York
Yankees have had some lean years in their history. But, overall,
they have been the model of excellence for a very long time.
And people still love to watch them play — whether to cheer
for them or to boo them.
European Soccer is another example of a sport that has had
dominant teams for a long time. That’s true, in large part,
because teams are generally free to buy talent as they see fit.
Players will move to the teams that most value their skills, and
there is great competition among owners to attract those 
players. It’s an open system, and there is a trap door at the 
bottom. If you don’t win enough games, you fall into a lesser
league. You might argue that they go a little too far in the 
direction of single-team or two-team dominance, but the sport
is still extremely popular. I should
also note that most European soccer
teams actually do not make money
over the long haul. They have huge
revenues, but even bigger expenses.
Most clubs need a capital call every
few years, and generally there are
wealthy fans and investors who are
willing to meet those calls. 
RF: Do you find it surprising that many European 
countries which have public policies based on the 
social-democratic model at the same time have quite 
market-oriented rules for their sports teams, while in the
United States the situation is often reversed?
Sauer: Sure. It’s a deep irony. And I don’t really have a good
explanation for it. Perhaps a sociologist would be better
equipped to answer that question than an economist.  
RF: Are there economic reasons why professional soccer
has had such a hard time gaining widespread attention in
the United States, despite its overwhelming popularity in
other parts of the world?
Sauer: I think it goes back to the social capital idea. It takes a
lot to overcome the incumbent advantage of sports like 
baseball, basketball, and football, which are popular today in
the United States. I think that, slowly, soccer will gain fans and
there may be a tipping point. But one of the interesting things
about Major League Soccer (MLS) is that some of the leading
figures are also involved with the NFL. Lamar Hunt, the
founder and owner of the NFL ’s Kansas City Chiefs, also is
one of the founders of MLS and owns a team in the league.
MLS has something like the NFL ’s business model. And I’m
not so sure that Hunt really wants MLS to grow and for teams
to compete in the way that some other owners in the league
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have in mind. For instance, their cur-
rent business model — teams
generally play in pretty small stadiums
and don’t bid for the services of the
big European stars — doesn’t make
for a compelling, top-notch product.
So, getting back to one of your 
earlier questions, if there is a league
that is ripe to be supplanted by an
upstart, maybe it’s MLS. There
appears to be growing demand for
professional soccer in the United
States, and MLS is not meeting that
demand very well, in my view. Sport
these days is a media-driven business,
and the skill on display in an MLS
match is nowhere close to that in
Europe. Americans will watch the
more compelling spectacle, even if
the match may be taking place in
Barcelona or London.
RF: What do you think of proposals to pay college athletes?
Sauer:Well, actually there is some payment. Every time college
players go on the road for an away game, they get a per diem
payment to cover meals and other expenses. That’s more than
they used to get. Will this evolve into a system where there are
significant monthly stipends, thousands of dollars per month
per player? I doubt it. 
For the big-revenue sports — like football and basketball —
the money is there. For instance, coaching salaries have 
exploded recently, because if a guy can win without cheating,
he’s worth a tremendous amount of money to the school. The
same is true of players. You can’t necessarily identify who those 
guys are in advance. There are a lot of great high school players
who wind up being only mediocre college players. But once 
it becomes clear who the stars are, those guys are worth 
huge amounts of money to their schools. But I think there is
great aversion among sports fans to paying college players an
amount that is something proportionate to the revenue that
they bring to a school. Whether that is rational or not, I think
it is a serious impediment to liberalizing compensation rules for
college athletes.
RF: What do you think has been driving the realignment of
major college athletic conferences?
Sauer: I think the fundamental reason is that competition has
become national. In the old days, Clemson University used to
play in the Southern Conference. But in the 1950s, Clemson
and Maryland chafed at some of the Southern Conference rules
and led the revolt to form the Athletic Coast Conference
(ACC), which was built on the eight-team model that was very
common then. The ACC was perceived as Tobacco Road, a
regional conference that stretched across only four states:
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. But eventually
that regional image was viewed as a
liability and something that the 
conference wanted to shake, so it
expanded all the way up and down 
the coast. 
Asimilar thing happened in the old
Pac-8, but earlier. They wanted to
expand and actually added two
schools in a state that doesn’t even
border the Pacific Ocean — Arizona
and Arizona State — to form the 
Pac-10. The SEC expanded as well,
and so did the Big 8. I think this has
come at some cost to the sporting
competition — for instance, North
Carolina State will no longer play
Duke twice a year in a home/home
series — but to the advantage of 
getting national exposure and more media revenue. Schools in
the ACC will now play conference games in Miami and Boston,
two major media outlets, and that can be a big benefit. 
It’s amazing when you look at the license plates from the
students on campus here at Clemson. They come from 
everywhere. I think most universities that want to be perceived
as quality places will try to get national recognition, and one big
way to do so is by playing sports on national television. You
don’t get that type of exposure by playing only nearby schools.
If you win big, you get noticed. So I think college athletics is a
form of competition for attention, much like advertising.   
RF: What do you think of the hypothesis that Michael
Lewis put forward in Moneyball?
Sauer: Moneyball was a fascinating book. It had great writing, a
great story, and was compelling reading. But at the core 
of it was an economic idea: that wages in the market for 
professional baseball players were not well-priced, and that one
could exploit these discrepancies to win a lot of games at 
relatively low cost. In particular, the ability to take a pitch and
to get on base in any way you could were undervalued. The
Oakland Athletics — and, in particular, their general manager
Billy Beane — figured that out, and were able to get to the 
playoffs for several consecutive years on a very tight budget. 
At its core, I find the Moneyball hypothesis offensive. I tend to
think that, as a general matter, labor markets work quite well, and
returns to skill are valued appropriately. But the Oakland example
was in opposition to my belief in labor market efficiency. So my
colleague Jahn Hakes and I decided to investigate it more in a
paper that will be coming out in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives. We found that Lewis’ offensive idea was correct. 
On-base percentage was undervalued, and buying on-base 
percentage went a long way toward explaining Oakland’s success.
How do we explain this? I think what Lewis found was a
very clear-cut example of institutional inertia. A lot of old 
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baseball scouts had a cer-
tain idea of which skills
made for a good baseball
player — and those
weren’t necessarily right.
Yet once those ideas
took hold, they tended to
stick. Someone eventual-
ly questioned and tested
them, and decided there
was another way to 
evaluate talent. Beane
was a real innovator, and
he was able to exploit the
opportunities that he
saw. But it’s very hard to
do this over an extended period of time. This information will
be exploited by others — indeed, we have seen it recently with
several other teams. Just about every front office in Major
League Baseball has guys poring through data looking for 
statistical patterns that can give them an advantage. As a result,
there will be new innovations in assessing talent that might
prove even more effective.
RF: Has the exposure that Moneyball received affected the
field of sports economics?
Sauer: Not much, I think. The paper that Hakes and I did has
been well-received and has been downloaded a lot. But I think
there are some examples that go beyond Moneyball that are
interesting to note here. There are a number of papers where
people have modeled different games, and it’s interesting for
us as economists and applied econometricians to do those
exercises. We don’t have an impact on things very often, but
occasionally we do. One example of this is the work that David
Romer did on fourth-down decisions made by football 
coaches. If you model a football game properly, you can look at
the costs and benefits of doing various things. The thing that
Romer focused on was the decision to give up the ball on
fourth down by punting. It turns out that coaches were
extremely conservative on this point. They hardly ever went
for it on fourth down, even in short-yardage situations in their
opponent’s territory. But if you look at the data, there are no
real benefits from punting in those situations and the net costs
can be very large.
Over time, I think Romer’s message has gotten through.
You see a lot more people going for it on fourth down than in
the past. Bill Belichick, the head coach of the New England
Patriots, makes decisions that are very data-driven — he was an
economics major at Wesleyan — and he goes for it on fourth
down a lot of the time. Similarly, you see more coaches going for
the touchdown now instead of settling for a field-goal attempt.
So coaches are increasingly taking risks when they are 
appropriate, and I think the work economists did pointing out
the costs associated with excessive caution helped move them
in this direction.
RF: People often complain that tickets to sporting events
have become too expensive. But for many games, at 
current prices, demand greatly outstrips supply. Why don’t
franchises and leagues respond to such demand by upping
the price of tickets instead of having them sold on the 
secondary market at prices well above their face value?
Sauer: Well, the tickets are more expensive now — a lot more
expensive — because demand is so high. Part of what is going
on is that quality seats have become luxury goods. So great tick-
ets are very expensive, but baseball clubs can’t give away upper
deck tickets. The Oakland A’s just decided to cover them up
with a fancy tarp. So there is a tricky pricing problem here —
how variable should prices be across seats and games, 
particularly when there is well-established demand for season
tickets? Now, the clubs could operate secondary markets 
themselves, but if we look at rock concerts, the bands that
adopt this function still price well below market. They attempt
as best they can to keep the tickets in the hands of “real fans.”
On this point, I don’t think economic reasoning has gotten us
very far, even though an economist as brilliant as the late
Sherwin Rosen took a crack at it. 
RF: What do you make of the claim that white sports stars
command a salary premium compared to black and
Hispanic players of similar or even superior skill?
Sauer: A few of my colleagues have worked on these questions,
and there is some evidence that white players do command a
salary premium in today’s market. The evidence is not especially
strong and what does exist suggests that the premium is rather
small. But it’s there. One might regard it as prima facie evidence
of discrimination. Or it could be something that is unobserved,
correlated with race, and not captured in the model.
But, over a longer period of time, there is a lot of evidence of
discrimination. Blacks were permitted to play in professional
football, then banned, and then permitted to play again. In
baseball, blacks were excluded for the first half of the 20th 
century. So the ability to even get on the playing field was 
limited by discrimination. You had integration, but it was a
long, hard process. As social mores changed, there was real
opportunity for innovation. There was this very large untapped
pool of black talent out there, and innovators like Branch
Rickey recognized it. What’s interesting, though, is that the
best teams led the drive to integration. They were the ones that
first signed black players and so these teams got even better.
Two of my colleagues at Clemson, Bob Tollison and Bobby
McCormick, along with Brian Goff of Western Kentucky
University, had a very interesting paper on this topic that
appeared a few years ago in the American Economic Review.
As for salaries, I haven’t seen good data from this period —
say, the late 1940s and early 1950s. I would like for the question
of wage discrimination from this era to be examined. The 
conditions then were stark, much starker than the present day.
So one would suspect that the evidence for discrimination
would be stronger than it is now.   spring 2006 • Region Focus 41
RF: Elected officials often claim that professional sports
teams bring substantial economic benefits to a city, both
direct (spending at the stadium and nearby businesses) as
well as indirect (makes the city more attractive to talented
workers). How large are those benefits, in your opinion,
and do they justify public funding of new stadiums?   
Sauer: Well, I think the second claim is true. Many talented
people do like sports, and those people generally like to live in
areas where they can watch live sporting events. And since
there are a limited number of pro franchises available, having a
professional sports team is a benefit to a city. I don’t think it’s
implausible that some companies base their location decisions,
in part, on whether amenities like this are available to their
employees and potential employees.
But the claim that new stadiums can act as a more general
development tool strikes me as a pretty questionable idea.
There has been a lot of work done in this area, and no reputable
study has found that, on average, there are substantial eco-
nomic effects. It’s generally not a winning proposition for a city.
There might be more activity around a stadium or arena on
the night of a game. But what about when those teams are on
the road or it’s the off-season? There are usually very few 
people around. Also, households generally have a budget for
leisure expenses. If you build a stadium, you might see more
dollars go to businesses around that stadium during certain
times of the year, but that increased spending tends to be offset
by reduced spending somewhere else.
To take a recent example, I think the deal Washington, D.C.,
struck to build a publicly funded stadium represents the ugly
side of sports. Major League Baseball owners, in my opinion,
took the residents of the District of Columbia to the cleaners.
The league — meaning, essentially, the current teams’ owners
— set a limit on how many franchises there will be. So there are
30 teams, and when one of them is looking to move, a bidding
war erupts among cities. And Washington, D.C., simply over-
paid. Policymakers can spend other people’s money pretty
readily, and owners of franchises are taking advantage of that.
RF: One of the fastest growing sports is stock-car racing.
NASCAR has gone from a pretty small and mostly 
regional sport to one with widespread national appeal.
What accounts for its growth?
Sauer: NASCAR’s rise — and its growth relative to Indy 
Car racing, for example — I think is due to its economic 
organization. The guys at NASCARhave been able to unify the
old stock-car racing circuits into a more coherent organization,
and they understand that people want to watch a season-long
event. There are select races — Daytona, Talladega — that get
more attention than others. But, generally, fans follow it over
the course of a season, just like they do with team sports.
NASCARhas refined its points race in a way that produces real
drama. And we are seeing other individual sports follow
NASCAR’s lead. For instance, in golf, the PGAwill implement
a season-long points race next year.
RF: Getting back to your work on sports betting 
markets, are there some areas of those markets that are
less efficient than others?
Sauer:As I said before, I think sports betting markets are
overwhelmingly efficient. Bookmakers aren’t in business
to just give money away. They know what they are doing,
and the point spreads they establish are a very good 
forecast of what is going to happen. But if there is one 
area where the lines tend to be wrong in something
approaching a systematic way, it’s with home underdogs.
Betting on home underdogs in basketball and football,
over a long period of time, tends to be slightly profitable.
But the margins, even here, are quite small. Still, it 
suggests that we as fans, and also the bookmakers, don’t
have a really good understanding of what home-field
advantage means for a team. 
I don’t want to make too much of this point, though.
Betting lines are, by far, the best predictor of what is going
to happen in a game. And that shouldn’t be particularly
surprising. There’s money on the line, after all, and that’s a
powerful incentive to get things right.
RF: Do you have a sense of who reads your blog, 
thesportseconomist.com? Is it primarily sports fans,
other economists, or a combination of the two?
Sauer: We have a pretty eclectic audience: sports fans,
economists, reporters, all sorts of people. I launched it 
two years ago this month. I did it for one year by myself, 
but once it got some traction I decided to get some 
collaborators to bolster and expand the content. I think
that’s the right model for more academic-oriented blogs. If
you can get a group of people who can stay focused on a 
relatively well-defined set of topics, then you can generate
some really good material.   
The blog is a nice medium because it gives you exposure
to people you otherwise might not have met and ideas 
you might not have encountered. This includes even other
economists who are doing work on similar questions, but
with whom you are unfamiliar.
RF: Which economists have influenced you the most?
Sauer: I have picked up insights from a lot of people along
the way. But the guy who made the biggest difference in my
coming to Clemson and perhaps in the way I look at 
economics was Donald F. Gordon. Don was a brilliant 
economist. He never wrote very much, but what he did was
pure gold. Just sitting and talking with him over lunch was
quite an experience because you were in the presence of 
real genius. There’s a quote in Doug North’s Nobel Prize
autobiography which says that Don Gordon taught him all
the economics he ever knew. That may be overstating the
case, but I never failed to learn something from every 
conversation that I had with Don.  RF